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I 
INTRODUCTION 
As the poet Mark Strand said, “The future is always beginning now.”1  
When considering the social impact that neuroscience and behavioral genetics 
will have on the criminal justice system, scientists, lawyers, courts, and 
policymakers might do well to keep Strand’s words in mind.  Too often it is 
assumed that for developments in science and technology, there is time to start 
the policy dialogue in “the future.”  Those who would address the issues later 
typically assert that the science in question is too immature, that it is too early, 
that the discussion is too speculative.  While such objections sometimes have 
merit, it seems society is most often too slow in promoting a public dialogue. 
Open public dialogue is an important tool in considering and weighing 
public reaction, in informing the public and policymakers, and in building public 
consensus about appropriate and responsible uses of science and technology.  
Scientific advancements can result in strong, negative public reactions, as with 
nuclear power in the United States, genetically modified food crops in the 
European Union, and human research cloning in a variety of nations.  This 
negative backlash can in turn influence scientists and science policy and slow 
the progress of socially valuable research.  When the social risks are great, it 
may be prudent to slow the pace of research.  However, when the risks are 
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minimal, and the negative reaction is based on incomplete or inaccurate 
information about the science, then restraints on research serve little purpose.   
Now is the time to call on scientists, lawyers, courts, and lawmakers to begin 
a sustained dialogue focused on the impact that scientific discoveries and 
technological advances might have on the criminal law.  The dialogue should 
focus on developing appropriate policies to address the legal and social issues 
raised by such advances.  Such a dialogue is necessary, in particular, concerning 
the focus of this essay:  the impact of neuroscience and behavioral genetics on 
criminal law.  
This article first briefly considers some of the commonalities and differences 
between behavioral genetics and neuroscience as they relate to the criminal law, 
including topics addressed by both fields, as well as how each field might be 
applied in criminal proceedings.  The article then focuses on a common concern 
raised by both fields in this context—the possible misuse of science in the 
criminal law.  It concludes with a proposal to address the need for a continuing 
policy dialogue about the law and scientific developments in neuroscience and 
behavioral genetics. 
II 
A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 
The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)2 has 
sought to advance the public and policy dialogues in both behavioral genetics 
and neuroscience in the past few years.3  It is reasonable to ask why anyone 
would consider the effect on the criminal law of two broad scientific fields, 
rather than deal with each separately.  It seems increasingly clear, though, that 
when describing, predicting, and understanding human behavior, numerous 
scientific discussions may be considered part of one larger discussion; various 
scientific fields converge in their exploration and explanation of human actions.  
It makes some scientific sense to talk about neuroscience and behavioral 
genetics together; indeed, the disciplines overlap and interact—for example, a 
person’s genes affect how his brain develops.4  It similarly makes legal sense to 
 
 2. AAAS is a non-profit, non-governmental organization located in Washington, D.C.  It is the 
largest general scientific organization in the world and publisher of the journal SCIENCE.  According to 
its website, “AAAS serves some 262 affiliated societies and academies of science, serving 10 million 
individuals.”  About AAAS, http://www.aaas.org/aboutaaas.  AAAS is “open to all and fulfills its 
mission to ‘advance science and serve society’ through initiatives in science policy; international 
programs; science education; and more.”  Id. 
 3. For more information, please see the website for the Scientific Freedom, Responsibility & Law 
Program, http://www.aaas.org/spp/sfrl/about/mission.shtml.  Of particular relevance are the Behavioral 
Genetics Project site, http://www.aaas.org/spp/bgenes, and the Neuroscience and the Law site, 
http://www.aaas.org/spp/sfrl/projects/neuroscience.  Project publications are available for free download 
at both sites.  
 4. Another example of this overlap can be found in the emergence of a new, complex behavioral 
biology—one that will ultimately be not only descriptive but predictive.  See Owen D. Jones & Timothy 
H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005).  Many scientific 
disciplines will contribute to the knowledge base that will underlie such a biology. 
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consider a larger behavioral biology, and it makes sense to consider the two 
fields together from a policy perspective.  Moreover, public dialogues at AAAS 
and elsewhere on behavioral genetics and neuroscience suggest that both 
disciplines are ripe for further discussion about their nexus with criminal law 
and policy. 
III 
COMMON ISSUES OF INTEREST 
Behavioral genetics and neuroscience converge on a number of scientific, 
legal, social, and ethical issues—in particular, on two areas of interest to the 
criminal justice system:  the prediction of behavior and the use of behavioral 
information in the preliminary stages of criminal processes. 
A. Prediction of Behavior: Mitigation 
Both neuroscience and behavioral genetics have focused considerably on 
explaining and predicting behavior.5  Much discussion has focused on “ultimate” 
issues such as free will, determinism (genetic or mechanistic), and their effect on 
whether the concept of criminal culpability will be undone by new scientific 
discoveries.  This seems unlikely, at least in the near future.6  A more intriguing 
and immediate concern is how scientific findings will affect the criminal law 
regarding the mitigation of criminal responsibility.  For example, neuroscience 
and behavioral genetics seem particularly likely to play a role in addressing 
drug addiction; findings in both fields may be relevant to how society chooses to 
 
 5. Courts and prosecutors currently use prediction constantly—in plea bargaining, sentencing, 
decisions about levels of probation, and case diversion, among other proceedings.  As the parties 
involved seek to weigh future risks, including the likelihood of recidivism, they do so knowing that our 
predictive models and abilities are really very poor.  To the extent that neuroscience and behavioral 
genetics can better inform such predictions, the courts and criminal justice system could stand to 
benefit significantly. 
The risk, of course, is that predictive decisions will be based on poor or incomplete science.  
Additionally, neuroscience-based or genetics-based predictions may be given undue weight as 
“scientific predictions” while still prone to the problems inherent in current risk prediction models, 
including construction bias in the normative or sample groups and the inability of predictive measures 
to provide information about any specific individual beyond probabilistic information about a group to 
which the subject belongs. 
The pressing need for courts to make decisions about sentencing and risk management increases the 
risk for early adoption of immature “predictive models.”  The courts are in a difficult place with 
prediction—they cannot wait for the next round of peer-reviewed research results.  See generally Erica 
Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent Behavior in a 
Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845 (2003) (discussing this challenge, particularly that 
juries should get both predictive information as well as details as to the limitations of such information). 
 6. Nor, indeed, will it be undone in the long term.  As Stephen Morse has argued in the context of 
neuroscience, the idea of criminal responsibility is not an artifact of science, but, like law itself, a human 
construct that is mind-dependent; since we are constrained by our view of ourselves as rational agents, 
our constructs will reflect these views.  This is admittedly a gross simplification of Morse’s argument.  
See Steven J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, 
MIND AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 157 (Brent Garland ed., 2004). 
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handle criminal behavior that accompanies addiction, such as drug possession.7  
Neuroscience has shown that the brains of addicts are different from those of 
non-addicts,8 and there appears to be a genetic predisposition towards 
addiction.9  As with criminal behavior generally, the question arises whether 
such information (neuroscientific or genetic) should mitigate criminal 
responsibility, at least when there is evidence of neurological or genetic 
differences in the accused. 
Neuroscience adds a gloss to this question by providing highly effective 
pharmaceutical treatments for opiate addiction that are currently available and 
yet not widely in use.10  One drug, naltrexone, serves to block the pleasurable or 
rewarding effect of the opiates by blocking the receptors to which the opiates 
bind, preventing their euphoric effects.11  As long as the individual is compliant 
in taking naltrexone, relapse, in the sense of experiencing the pleasurable 
aspects of opiate use, is impossible.  Successful drug treatment not only reduces 
the health risks associated with drug use, but also eliminates the legal risk of 
incarceration for possession of drugs or drug paraphernalia.  Drug addicts 
could, in theory, be diverted to a mandatory treatment program at a much 
lower cost than incarceration.  Thus, by changing the way that society views and 
understands addiction, drug use, and treatment, neuroscience has the potential 
to reshape our policies on criminalization and incarceration as they pertain to 
drug-related offenses. 
Indeed, mitigation is the most obvious issue that the scientific, legal, and 
policy communities must face with some immediacy.  This need was highlighted 
most recently by the Supreme Court decision in Roper v. Simmons, which 
barred capital punishment for juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen.12  
The opinion referred to “the scientific and sociological studies”13 cited by the 
respondent and amici as confirming a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped 
sense of responsibility” found in the young.14  Several amici briefs15 cite brain 
 
 7. The potential upside for better understanding addiction is important since treating addiction is 
viewed by many as a long-term, if not lifelong, process.  The relapse rate is high, and the legal penalties 
for illegal drug use are substantial. 
 8. See, e.g., Alan I. Leshner, Addiction is a Brain Disease, and It Matters, 278 SCIENCE 45 (1997); 
Nora D. Volkow, Beyond the Brain: The Medical Consequences of Abuse and Addiction, NIDA NOTES, 
Feb. 2004, at 3. 
 9. For a brief review article, see Eric J. Nestler, Genes and Addiction, 26 NATURE GENETICS 277 
(2000). 
 10. Neuroscience can offer a brain-based treatment in a way that behavioral genetics cannot—that 
is, behavioral genetics is unlikely to offer a form of gene therapy for addiction anytime soon.  See, for 
example, Charles P. O’Brien, A Range of Research-Based Pharmacotherapies for Addiction, 278 
SCIENCE 66 (1997). 
 11. For a brief overview of these treatments, see Christian A. Heidbreder & Jim J. Hagan, Novel 
Pharmacotherapeutic Approaches for the Treatment of Drug Addiction and Craving, 5 CURRENT 
OPINION IN PHARMACOLOGY 107 (2005).  Opiates are not the only drugs for which new treatments are 
being developed.  For example, one vaccine, TA-CD, reduces the euphoric effects of cocaine.  Cocaine 
Vaccine Trials Progress, BBC NEWS, Apr. 2, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/1906823.stm. 
 12. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
 13. Id. at 1195. 
 14. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
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studies as offering evidence of immaturity and lack of judgment sufficient to 
mitigate a juvenile’s culpability, even when the juvenile engages in the worst 
behavior—behavior for which society reserves the death penalty.16 
In comparison, the well-known Brunner study of a Dutch family in the 
1990s17 helped raise a similar question regarding whether behavioral genetics 
should be considered in mitigation.  The study discovered a very rare defect in 
the gene encoding for monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), an enzyme that helps 
break down certain neurotransmitters.18  The defect appeared to correlate with 
antisocial behavior,19 which raised the obvious question of how such a finding 
might be used in arguing for mitigation in criminal cases. 
Shortly after the research was published, defense counsel in a death penalty 
case filed a motion seeking funds to determine whether their client suffered 
from a deficiency of enzymatic activity for MAOA, with a request for follow-up 
genetic testing as well.20  The trial court denied the defense request, “finding 
that the theory behind the request for funds will not have reached a scientific 
stage of verifiable certainty in the near future and that [the defendant] could 
not show that such a stage will ever be reached.”21   
Although the court was correct in rejecting the science as premature, 
research continues on the correlation between MAOA and antisocial behavior.  
Subsequent research published in 2002 suggests that children with low MAOA 
expression who are maltreated may be at a greater risk for antisocial behavior,22 
though a more recent study failed to replicate those findings.23  Similar MAOA 
challenges are likely in the future as the literature evolves. 
Even if MAOA challenges or other arguments based on behavioral genetics 
are accepted by courts in the future, it is not always clear which way scientific 
 
 15. See  Juvenile Death Penalty Amicus Briefs, http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/simmons/ 
simmonsamicus.html (last visited May 24, 2005). 
 16. Although the Court did not directly cite any specific amicus brief, several amici supporting the 
respondent cited neuroscientific support for their position.  Although none could conclude that the 
neuroscience was controlling in the Court’s decision in Roper, it is reasonable to expect that lawyers 
will be citing to neuroscience developments in the future.  For example, the amicus brief filed by the 
American Psychological Association and the Missouri Psychological Association argued that 
neuropsychological research suggests that the adolescent brain is not as developed as the mature adult’s 
brain; similarly, the brief filed by the American Medical Association made a similar “immature brain” 
argument.  See id. 
 17. H.G. Brunner et al., Abnormal Behavior Associated With a Point Mutation in the Structural 
Gene for Monoamine Oxidase A, 262 SCIENCE 578 (1993). 
 18. Id. at 579. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61, 65 (Ga. 1995).  See also Deborah W. Denno, Legal Implications 
of Genetics and Crime Research, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR 248, 251–53 
(Gregory R. Bock & Jamie A. Goode eds., 1996). 
 21. Mobley, 455 S.E.2d at 66. 
 22. Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children, 297 
SCIENCE 851 (2002). 
 23. Brett C. Haberstick et al., Monoamine Oxidase A (MAOA) and Antisocial Behaviors in the 
Presence of Childhood and Adolescent Maltreatment, 135 AM. J. MED. GENETICS (PART B: 
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC GENETICS) 59 (2005). 
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knowledge will cut when introduced at trial.  For example, while a defendant 
could argue for mitigation due to some genetic propensity or neurological 
defect (“bad genes” or a “bad brain” led him astray), the prosecution could 
make a counterargument for aggravation, saying that the defendant is even 
more dangerous because he is biologically predisposed to commit crime and 
thus should be incarcerated rather than given probation.  This mirror side to 
mitigation arguments should also be included in the policy dialogue. 
B. Preformal Uses 
Neuroscience and behavioral genetics converge on issues other than 
mitigation related to how and when to use possibly relevant findings from these 
sciences: 
[A significant fear], both in the behavioral genetics area and with [neuroscience], is 
that there are no [rules of evidence] that control the use of these kinds of technologies 
in the preformal stages of criminal processes.  When it gets to the formality of 
sentencing, the cry will come up, but the ability of judges and prosecutors to make 
decisions about whether they’re going to initiate charges, [whether] they’re going to 
accept diversion [from criminal prosecution] for people, et cetera—using 
[neuroscience tests] that haven’t been validated—is a serious risk that the technology 
poses.24 
Such concerns offer a good example of a policy question that also needs to be 
addressed in the near future:  how neuroscience and behavioral genetics 
findings might be used by the legal system in “preformal” settings—that is, prior 
to bringing criminal charges.  For example, defense counsel could bring test 
results to prosecutors as part of a precharging dialogue, seeking dismissal, 
reduction of charges, or some other outcome.25  Such usages would essentially 
be unreviewable and possibly nonpublic.  In addition, such information could be 
considered without even the minimal protections offered by the Daubert26 or 
Frye27 tests regarding admissibility in formal proceedings.28  Although the exact 
 
 24. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 38 (quoting neuroscientist participant). 
 25. To give the prosecution their fair share of concern, district attorneys could seek genetic or 
neuroscientific information in deciding to bring charges, or use it in arguments to a grand jury to secure 
an indictment. 
 26. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), superseded by statute, 
FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 27. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.  1923). 
 28. The admissibility of scientific information into evidence at trial is generally governed by two 
approaches: 
(1) The Frye standard allows for the admission of scientific evidence when the scientific technique, 
data, or method is generally accepted by the scientific community in the relevant field.  293 F. at 1014.  
The courts relied on the members of the relevant scientific discipline for the standard, with “general 
acceptance” usually being proven through additional expert testimony, the citing of standard reference 
materials in the discipline, and various other methods.  Id. 
(2) The newer approach, and the one now codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence, is the Daubert 
standard, which offers four criteria for courts to use in their evaluations:  (a) falsifiability, which asks if 
the theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (b) subjection of the theory or technique to peer 
review; (c) the known or potential error rate of the methodology or technique; and (d) a Frye-like 
general acceptance criteria.  509 U.S. at 592–95.  The four elements form a flexible rule, one whose 
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nature of these preformal usages is unclear, it seems prudent for policymakers, 
lawyers, and scientists to consider how such uses might be addressed in ways 
that are socially, legally, and scientifically appropriate. 
IV 
INSTRUCTIVE DIFFERENCES 
Both genetics and neuroscience raise many of the same policy questions 
when it comes to issues such as the prediction of behavior, but there are 
obviously areas in which the fields differ.  Nevertheless, even when there are 
differences, the policy dialogue can be enriched by considering the two fields 
together.  The dialogue that has already begun about genetics may serve to 
inform and shape the way society thinks about neuroscience, and neuroscience 
may have some lessons for behavioral genetics as well.  For example, genetics in 
general garnered a fair amount of early attention from the public and 
policymakers.  As the human genome project advanced, lawmakers in several 
states enacted laws to protect genetic information and to guard against 
potentially discriminatory uses.29  This was an unusual and entirely proactive 
approach to policymaking, as there had generally been no litigation about 
genetic discrimination at that point.  The mere specter of risk of misuse of 
genetic information had caused lawmakers to act. 
Yet no such actions have been spurred on by recent developments in 
neuroscience.  The link between brain and behavior is much closer than the link 
between genes and behavior, but the attention to genetics research and its 
broad social implications has far outweighed that given to neuroscience and 
technology.30  Neuroscience could likely benefit from the same public 
consideration and policy dialogue. 
A. Essentialism and Exceptionalism 
The potential impact of genetic “exceptionalism”31 and genetic 
“essentialism”32 is an area in which the policy dialogue in genetics has outpaced 
 
focus should be on determining scientific validity, meaning the evidentiary relevance and reliability.  Id. 
at 594–95. 
 29. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.345 (2005) (forbidding the use of genetic testing for employment). 
Although the U.S. Congress has yet to pass comprehensive legislation to prevent genetic 
discrimination, bills have been proposed several times.  For example, in 2003, the Senate passed the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, but the bill failed to pass the House.  S. 1053, 108th Cong. 
(2004).  The Senate has passed the bill again in the current Congress.  Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act, S. 306, 109th Cong. (2005).  See also Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of 
Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 669 (2001) 
(providing a brief overview and analysis of some state genetic information laws). 
 30. See Open Your Mind, THE ECONOMIST, May 23, 2002, at 79 (discussing the legal implications 
of neuroscientific research). 
 31. In genetics, a concern has arisen that passing laws and special rules for genetic discrimination 
(rather than treating such matters under current anti-discrimination schemes, like the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000)), will result in a perception by the public that genetic 
factors are more important and determinative of our well-being and behavior than they actually are.  
This singling out of genetic information for special protection seems to indicate an exceptionally 
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the dialogue in neuroscience and in which the thinking on genetics has been 
especially instructive.  Both exceptionalism and essentialism deal with the idea 
that the public may perceive scientific information about a person as being 
more powerfully determinative than it in fact is. 
For genetics, these constructs seem to have worked well in guiding 
discussion and in thinking about appropriate policy.  However, the essentialism 
argument may not be as obvious in neuroscience as it is in genetic science.33  
People may see their brains as being much more “who they are” than their 
genes, and they may accordingly offer less resistance to using neuroscientific 
information in criminal and other court proceedings.  This aspect of brain 
science may not have even been considered as potentially problematic, had it 
not been for the genetics policy debates. 
B. Truth-telling 
Neuroscience may have something instructive to offer behavioral genetics in 
the field of truth-telling,34 since it is more likely than behavioral genetics to 
develop techniques to tell when someone is lying.  The development of accurate 
and reliable neuroscience-based lie detection is already being vigorously 
explored by researchers, and this has obvious value to the law.35  If such 
 
powerful amount or type of knowledge—hence, genetic exceptionalism.  A similar concern would arise 
regarding neuroscientific information. 
 32. Essentialism is the idea that the person is reducible to some limited element of their biology, 
that is, “I am my genes” or “I am my brain.” 
 33. As Stanford law professor Henry Greely observed in the AAAS neuroscience and law meeting, 
“It seems to be quite possible that I am my mind or I am my brain in a way that I’m quite clear I am not 
my genes.  My genes are not me.  My mind, my brain, well, maybe that is me.”  NEUROSCIENCE AND 
THE LAW, supra note 6, at 34 (quoting Greely). 
 34. Lie detection tests have frequently been held to be inadmissible, in part due to concerns about 
the accuracy and reliability of techniques such as the polygraph.  E.g., United States v. Scheffer, 523 
U.S. 303, 309–12 (1998).  For the types of questions discussed in the body of this paper, it is assumed 
that neuroscience is likely to eventually produce substantially more accurate and reliable testing in 
order for it to be admissible and relevant. 
  For a more in-depth discussion of some legal implications of neuroscience-based lie detection, 
see Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property: Some Possible Legal and Social 
Implications of Advances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 114.  
Greely notes several bases for excluding lie detection tests from court proceedings, including accuracy 
concerns and invasion of the purview of the jury in their role as finder of fact.  Id.  See also Laurence R. 
Tancredi, Neuroscience Developments and the Law, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 
71. 
 35. This is an area of strong research interest and is becoming increasingly sophisticated.  For 
example, one of the most significant hurdles facing accurate lie detection is what could be termed “the 
problem of unintentional deceit.”  Although techniques might be developed to detect when someone is 
intentionally lying, there might be real difficulty in detecting when someone is merely mistaken—that 
is, when they are engaging in unintentional deceit, subjectively telling the truth but being factually in the 
wrong.  See Paul Root Wolpe, et al., Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie Detection: Promises and 
Perils, 5(2) AM. J. BIOETHICS 1 (2005) (detailing some of the overall problems associated with lie 
detector technology).  Yet, even this difficult problem seems to be gradually yielding to researchers.  
See Scott D. Slotnick & Daniel L. Schacter, A Sensory Signature that Distinguishes True from False 
Memories, 7 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 664 (2004); Daniel L. Schacter & Scott D. Slotnick, The 
Cognitive Neuroscience of Memory Distortion, 44 NEURON 149 (2004), available at 
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/%7Eslotnick/articles/slotnick04_nat_neurosci_supp.pdf. 
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technology were to be successfully developed, lie detection could be used to 
evaluate the testimony of witnesses and defendants, to challenge jurors’ 
responses in voir dire, or to poll the jury following a verdict.  Courts would have 
to determine whether witnesses or defendants could be compelled to be tested 
for truthfulness and whether the judge or jury should be allowed to consider the 
refusal of a witness to take such a test.  All of these would be just the tip of the 
iceberg.   
Issues surrounding the acceptability and legality of compelled neuroscience-
based testing, including court decisions regarding when and how to use lie 
detection technology, would likely be instructive for any behavioral genetics 
tests that develop (such as one to determine a propensity for impulsive violence 
for use in either mitigation or evaluations of future risk). 
V 
A SHARED HISTORY 
Just as both fields share common areas of interest and application, they 
share a common problem—the problem of history.  The history of the criminal 
law and science is one that makes people cautious.  Prior uses of science to 
underpin law by politicians and policymakers include examples in which 
developing science was misused, and sometimes exploited, occasionally to 
brutal ends.36  Because of this history, any attempt to understand criminality 
from the basis of biology will suffer from suspicion and doubt, and many will 
have concerns that any such research findings or technologies will be used in 
oppressive and reactionary ways.  These public concerns about the possible 
abuse of science push just as strongly for a broad policy dialogue as do the 
hopes for valuable uses.37  One might call this “the curse of Lombroso”38—the 
haunting risk that immature science could be adopted and used for political and 
social purposes that feed into the worst of human behavior. 
History provides several examples of misguided efforts to apply science to 
the study of criminality and to use such findings to make policy and law.  By 
 
 36. See, e.g., NICOLE HAHN RAFTER, CREATING BORN CRIMINALS (1997) (offering an overview 
of biological theories of criminality from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries); Paul A. Lombardo, 
Genes and Disability: Defining Health and the Goals of Medicine: Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three 
Generations of ??? Are Enough?, 30 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 191 (2003) (considering contemporary genetic 
science in the context of the history of eugenics in America). 
 37. The potential for discriminatory or eugenic uses of modern genetics research is a good example 
of a modern public concern.  See Garland E. Allen, Is a New Eugenics Afoot?, 294 SCIENCE 59 (2001) 
(providing a historical overview of the development of the eugenics movement).  See also Paul A. 
Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive 
Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (1996) (discussing how the eugenics laws continue to 
play a role in our modern legal thinking). 
 38. Cesare Lombroso was a nineteenth-century Italian physician who developed the idea that 
criminals could be detected scientifically through anthropomorphic measurements.  Lombroso put 
forth the idea of the “born” criminal; while his theories were disproven, other concepts of the “born” 
criminal (or of innate criminality) would continue to play a dangerous role well into the twentieth 
century, including through the American eugenics movement. 
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now the examples are familiar—from Lombroso’s work in the 1800s to identify 
criminals by anthropomorphic measurements, to the hereditarian theories of 
some phrenologists, to the development of degeneration theory in the early 
twentieth century.39  Perhaps the most horrible American example of science 
being misused in policy and the law was the development of eugenic 
sterilization laws in the 1920s and 1930s—laws that sought to forcibly sterilize 
the “feeble-minded,” spurred at least in part by the intent to eliminate 
“inherited criminality.”  Anyone with any interest in this topic remembers the 
chilling words of Justice Holmes in Buck v. Bell, “Three generations of 
imbeciles are enough.”40  Perhaps the coldest chill, however, comes from the 
sentences preceding that famous line: 
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for 
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are 
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.  The principle that sustains compulsory 
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.41 
The Supreme Court upheld the compulsory eugenic sterilization laws of 
Virginia, other states took them as a model, and many people were forcibly 
sterilized under these laws. 
Although the history of American eugenics may be one of the most 
inflammatory examples of science being misused to make bad law and bad 
policy, not every time science and the criminal law meet means a disaster in the 
offing.  The law is not always easily swayed by attempts to use bad or immature 
science.  For example, during the 1960s a theory emerged regarding males who 
possessed an additional Y-chromosome.42  These so-called “XYY males” were 
thought to be particularly aggressive and inclined to violence and criminality.43  
In general, courts rejected attempts to admit such information.44  The impact on 
the law, such as it was, was rather mild, and eventually, the concept of the XYY 
male as someone who posed a high risk for criminal behavior was discredited.45 
What the eugenics experiment and the XYY theory have in common is the 
extent to which developing science was seized upon and used by nonscientists—
policymakers, politicians, judges, and lawyers—who sought to dress their 
agendas in the trappings of legitimate scientific debate.  In part, the ability to 
misuse science (and for lawyers to ineffectively combat such misuse) comes 
from the different approaches of the two cultures.  Science has a narrowing, 
problem-focused method, and its discoveries are seen as part of a continuing 
dialogue, open to change in light of new information.  The timeline is long, the 
knowledge slowly built up, but the entire system is open to complete 
 
 39. See generally RAFTER, supra note 36, (detailing a history of these examples). 
 40. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Deborah W. Denno, Comment, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free 
Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 619–20 (1988). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 620. 
 45. See id. at 622. 
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upheaval—hypotheses, after all, prompt disproof as well as proof.  Science 
values consensus and replicability. 
Lawyers and judges, on the other hand, often operate with little knowledge 
of science and the scientific method and work on a more pressing timeline to 
solve the problems immediately before them.  Law moves forward on 
advocacy—using the tools available at the time the conflict must be addressed. 
Policymakers add a third approach to the mix—one driven by political 
concerns and marginally limited in what issues can be considered in formulating 
positions.  Lawyers and scientists are somewhat constrained by the rules of law 
and peer review, respectively.  Policymakers, on the other hand, have broad, 
wide-sweeping powers and can seize on and implement policies with far-
reaching impacts that, once in place, can be quite difficult to revise. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The potential impact of neuroscience and behavioral genetics on the 
criminal law, the extent to which the fields converge on common areas, the 
history of science and the criminal law, and the potential for policymakers to 
seize on early findings for political goals all lead to this conclusion:  The time 
for a deep, broad, science-driven policy discussion is now.  Both neuroscience 
and behavioral genetics sit at the courtroom door.46  The issues at the forefront 
are not the more academic and philosophical ones of causation, free will, 
determinism, and responsibility, but rather those posed by technologies that are 
poised to come into courtroom and preformal use soon.  These technologies will 
lay the legal foundations for how courts think about and utilize these 
developing sciences, possibly for years to come.47 
 
 46. In fact, neuroscience has already entered the courtroom for a visit.  See Roper v. Simmons, 125 
S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (forbidding the death penalty for juvenile offenders in light of their ongoing 
psychological and emotional development). 
 47. Oftentimes, the fear is that weak or immature science will be accepted into evidence by a court, 
to be followed by a flood of decisions influenced by bad science.  There are other possible negative 
effects as well, including when the introduction of science seen as weak or immature results in a ban on 
all such evidence.  For example, in Virginia, a line of cases bars any and all testimony regarding a 
defendant’s mental state, unless an insanity defense is being asserted: 
The state of knowledge in the fields of medicine and psychiatry is subject to constant advance 
and change.  The classifications and gradations applied to mental illnesses, disorders, and 
defects are frequently revised.  The courts cannot, and should not, become dependent upon 
these subtle and shifting gradations for the resolution of each specific case. 
Stamper v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 682, 688 (Va. 1985) (citing Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 
(1946), and Wahrlich v. Arizona, 479 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1973)).  The level of scientific proof and 
relevance needed to reverse the ruling in Stamper remains unclear.  In the interim, the evidentiary bar 
would appear to preclude any and all testimony about mental state, be it psychiatric, psychological, 
medical, or neurological.  This bar has precluded testimony regarding the mental capacity of a 
defendant in a malicious wounding case in which the defendant, who had an established history of 
mental retardation and an estimated IQ of 65, shook and injured his infant son.  Funk v. 
Commonwealth, No. 1821-02-4, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 383 (2003).  See also Peeples v. Commonwealth, 
519 S.E.2d 382, 386 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding the exclusion of expert testimony from psychologist 
in aggravated malicious wounding case, where defense sought to admit evidence to rebut assumption of 
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Members of the scientific, legal, and criminal justice professions should join 
forces to advise and inform policymakers and the public on the scientific, legal, 
and social issues associated with advances in neuroscience and behavioral 
genetics.  This effort should strive to engage policymakers to make better, more 
fully informed decisions about science, the criminal law, and policy—decisions 
that would hopefully reduce the risks of the following:  unwarranted backlash to 
developments in science and technology, poorly informed legislation, and 
judicial decisions based on inappropriate or immature science.  If this 
multidisciplinary effort were successful in establishing itself as a valued resource 
and authority, the models it develops for assisting in the policy process could be 
applied to other areas of science, technology, and law. 
The proposal is not intended as a “thought experiment” or an academic 
exercise.  Failure to try such an approach will leave these matters to the 
vagaries of the political process or to a court system that is unprepared to 
address complex issues of science.  The very structure of the court system 
presses against the development of coherent and unified policies—courts 
develop policies as legal challenges are presented, not from a proactive, 
forward-looking approach.  As a consequence, the results may impair scientists’ 
ability to conduct research and society’s ability to benefit from useful 
technology.  Moreover, the adoption of controversial, poorly understood, and 
immature science by the courts or law enforcement could undermine public 
confidence in the legal system, as well as unfairly affect the rights of citizens. 
The initial political challenge facing such an effort will be to convince 
policymakers in all branches of government that the analysis is timely and 
relevant to them in governing.  To achieve this goal, the analysis must be 
capable of transcending narrow partisan and professional interests and should 
therefore reach out to a broad range of stakeholders in a genuine dialogue 
based on mutual respect for differences of opinion.  Such a dialogue should help 
to confer legitimacy on various policy options.  It is not enough that the 
dialogue be only among colleagues in a particular discipline, but it must also be 
conducted across fields, so that both the participants and the larger group of 
stakeholders may understand the wider context.  Broad, integrative thinking 
about what the sciences reveal to us about how we behave will help to shape 
better policy—from statutes and regulations to courtrooms. 
The ultimate challenge, however, is how to have a substantial and long-
lasting effect on policymaking.  The proposed effort must connect to 
government but cannot be captured by it, or else it becomes just another 
partisan battleground.  So the question arises:  How do you create a private 
body to exert influence on the policymaking process without being part of the 
government itself?  The question of how best to assist policymakers with 
 
malice and to bolster self-defense claim).  Stamper has also been interpreted to bar admission of 
psychiatric testimony that the defendant “lacked the capacity to form the necessary premeditation to 
commit the offense of capital murder as charged in the indictment.”  Smith v. Commonwealth, 389 
S.E.2d 871, 879–80 (Va. 1990) (citing Stamper, 324 S.E.2d at 688). 
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questions that span multiple areas of expertise, like science and law, is 
complicated.  As the sheer volume of scientific knowledge has increased, it 
seems clear that governmental and quasi-governmental bodies cannot by 
themselves fully advise and educate policymakers on all of the scientific, legal, 
and social issues associated with advances in science and technology.  In short, 
there are simply too many issues that would need to be addressed and too few 
governmental bodies to meet that need. 
Instead, the professional communities that have the relevant knowledge and 
expertise to educate and inform policymakers should combine efforts to serve 
as a non-governmental, non-partisan advisory body.  This ongoing neuroscience 
and law task force would monitor and assess future scientific developments as 
they occur and report on these developments to policymakers and the public.  
In addition to its ongoing deliberations, the task force could serve as “first 
responder” to emerging events that could affect neuroscience research as well 
as legal and policy decisions.  In this latter capacity, the task force would 
consider requests from scientists, legal professionals, and policymakers to 
review and comment on issues of pressing importance and provide information 
and guidance on these complex matters. 
The impact of neuroscience and behavioral genetics on the criminal law 
offers an opportunity to start such an effort on a small scale, by building on the 
types of discussions that are included in this volume and in other relevant 
proceedings.  Without such an effort in place, the public policy dialogue will go 
along in fits and starts—and our policies will be constantly playing “catch up” as 
the science surges forward. 
